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Abstract 
 
This paper proves the existence of non-empty cores for directed network problems 
with quotas and for those combinatorial allocation problems which permit only 
exclusive allocations.   
 
Introduction 
 
Networks among a group of agents, arise very often in society as well as in economic 
analysis. In a network, pairs of agents are linked to each other in a symmetric 
relationship. Slikker and van den Nouweland [2001], Dutta and Jackson [2003] and 
Jackson [2004], study the problem of network formation. In a recent work, Jackson 
and van den Nouweland [2004] study the existence of networks that are stable against 
changes in links by any coalition of individuals. 
However, not all interactions among individuals are of necessity symmetrical. Thus, 
for instance, when an agent decides to buy an object from another individual, it is not 
necessary that the resulting transaction, materializes in a direct exchange of objects. 
This problem was analyzed rigorously by Shapley and Scarf [1974], where each of a 
set of individuals was initially endowed with exactly one object and an allocation of 
the objects which could not be improved upon by any coalition of individuals by 
redistributing their initial endowments, was sought. An allocation such as this was 
called core stable and Shapley and Scarf [1974], used Gale’s Top Trading Cycle 
Algorithm to show that a core stable allocation for such a situation would always 
exist. 
In the situation that Shapley and Scarf[1974] analyzed, an allocation did not 
necessarily correspond to a network. If one agent received the object owned by a 
second, it did not follow that the second received the object owned by the first in 
return. An allocation would however correspond to what is known as a directed 
network. If a link was established from one agent to a second, all that it would imply 
is that the first agent received the object owned by the second. 
The situation studied by Shapley and Scarf[1974] was characterized by two features: 
(a) each agent consumed exactly one object: (b) excludability in consumption. While, 
the first feature was perhaps only a simplifying assumption, meant largely to facilitate 
exposition as subsequent research as well as a later section of our paper reveals, the 
same cannot be said of the second feature. Excludability in consumption implies that 
at most one agent can consume a particular item, a characteristic associated with 
“private goods”. There are many situations and objects which do not qualify this 
property. For instance, an internet server can be linked simultaneously to several 
other internet servers, not just one. A particular object or facility can be 
simultaneously used by several users, whose number does not exceed a pre-assigned 
quota. Such facilities or goods are akin to public goods. It is precisely such goods that 
we have in mind in the present context. 
As in Shapley and Scarf[1974], consider a finite population of agents, each of whom 
is initially endowed with a single item. Each item has a capacity denoting the number 
of agents it can simultaneously cater too. The quota of each agent which is assumed 
equal to the capacity of the item she is initially endowed with, imposes an upper 
bound on the number of items she can consume. The requirement that the quota of an 
agent is equal to the capacity of her initial endowment, implies that in any directed 
network that would be of interest in the present context, the number of links that 
terminate at any agent is equal to the number of links that emanate from her. In 
particular a link can be a loop i.e. begin and terminate at the same agent. The problem 
we are concerned with here, is with the existence of a directed network which 
satisfies individual quotas and is core stable in the following sense: there does not 
exist any coalition of agents who can link up among themselves and do better than at 
the existing network. We show that a slight modification of the Gale’s Top Trading 
Cycles Algorithm that was used by Shapley and Scarf[1974], proves the existence of 
a core stable network for every directed network problem with quotas. 
A directed network problem is an example of a combinatorial allocation problem 
(CAP). A CAP is a resource allocation problem, in which a non-empty set of items 
are to be allocated across a set of agents. Agents are assumed to value bundles of 
items. The CAP is relevant to many interesting and important real-world applications, 
including scheduling, logistics and network computation domains. When the set of 
items is identical to the set of agents, we have a directed network problem. 
An allocation of items in a CAP, where each individual is initially endowed with a 
distinct non-empty set of items is said to be exclusive, if no two items share an item at 
the allocation. 
Assuming that the maximum number of items that each agent can consume at any 
allocation is equal to the number of items she was initially endowed with, and 
restricting attention to exclusive allocations, we show that a core stable allocation 
always exists for such CAP’s. The proof of this result is very similar to the proof of 
the non-emptiness of the core of a directed network problem with quotas. 
 
 
The Directed Network Problem 
  
Given a non-empty finite set I of agents, a preference relation for agent i∈I is 
summarized by a linear order R(i) over I. 
A directed network is a function A: I → 2I, where I is a non-empty finite set of 
agents. A directed network is said to be a network if for all A∈Λ and i,j∈I: [j∈A(i) 
implies i∈A(j)]. 
We assume that each agent has a quota which is a natural number less than or equal to 
the cardinality of I. Hence, a quota function is a function q:I→ {0,….|I|}. 
A directed network problem with quotas is the ordered pair E = (Λ(q), <R(i) / i∈I>), 
where Λ(q) = {A/ A is a directed network satisfying [for all i∈I: |A(i)| ≤ q(i)]}. 
A directed network A for E =  (Λ(q), <R(i) / i∈I>) is said to be a feasible network (or 
simply “feasible”) if A∈Λ(q). 
 
The reason why there may be no directed network at which all agents exhaust their 
quota is illustrated by the following examples. 
 
Example 1: Let I = {1,2,3} with q(1) = 1, q(2) = 3 and q(3) = 3. Let A∈Λ(q) be such 
that |A(3)| = 3. Then, A(1) = {3}, A(3) = {1,2,3} and 1∉A(2). Thus, |A(2)| < 3. Thus, 
it is not possible for both 2 and 3 to satisfy their quotas. 
 
Example 2: Let I= {1,2,3,4} with q(1) = 1, q(2) = q(3) = q(4) = 4. Let A ∈Λ(q) be 
such that for at least i∈ {2,3,4}, |A(i)| = 4. Without loss of generality suppose |A(4)| = 
4. Thus, A(4) = I and A(1) = {4}. Since q(1) = 1, 1∉A(2) ∪A(3). Thus, |A(2)| < 4 and 
|A(3)| < 4. Thus, at least two agents in {2,3,4} must have unexhausted quotas at any 
A ∈Λ(q). 
  
A feasible network A is said to be blocked by a coalition (: a non-empty subset of 
agents) M, if there exists a permutation p: M→ M and a function y: M → 
such that for all i∈M: (i)p(i) R(i) y(i); (ii) p(i)∈I\A(i).  
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An alternative way of defining the concept of blocking by a coalition would be by 
using the concept of a unilateral hyper-relation due to Aizerman and Aleskerov 
[1995]. A unilateral hyper-relation on I is a subset of 2I×I. 
For i∈I and (S, j) ∈2I×I, we write S ≥i j if and only if either j∈S or kR(i)j for all k∈S. 
Clearly ≥i is a unilateral hyper-relation for all i∈I. 
A feasible network A is said to be blocked by a coalition (: a non-empty subset of 
agents) M, if there exists a permutation p: M→ M such that for no i∈M is it the case 
that A(i) ≥i p(i).  
A feasible network A is said to belong to the core of the directed network problem 
with quotas E, if it is not blocked by any coalition. 
The core of E, denoted Core(E) is the set of feasible networks belonging to the core 
of E. 
 
Given a list of distinct agents i1,…,ik we say that a transaction is completed along the 
cycle (i1,…,ik) if each ij∈{i2,…,ik} receives ij-1 and i1 receives ik.  Thus, if k = 1, then 
after completion of transaction along the cycle, agent i1 receives i1. 
 
The proof of the following theorem, which is a generalization of the one in Shapley 
and Scarf[1974], relies on a minor variation of the Gale’s Top Trading Cycles 
Algorithm. Our proof itself is a modification of the one in Shapley and Scarf[1974]. 
   
Theorem 1: If E is a directed network problem with quotas, then Core(E) is non-
empty.  
 
Proof: Stage 1: Each agent i points to the agent who owns her most preferred object 
according to the linear order Ri. Since, the number of agents is finite, there exists at 
least one subset of agents who form a cycle, i.e. there exists a set i1,…,ik of agents, 
such that ij is the most preferred item of agent ij-1 for ij∈{i2,…,ik} and i1 is the most 
preferred item of agent ik. Since each agent points to exactly one agent, no two 
distinct cycles can share an agent. Otherwise, there would exist an agent who points 
to two different agents, contrary to hypothesis. Complete the transaction along each 
such cycle. 
Each agent who does not get an object she had pointed to, was not part of a cycle. 
Each agent who received an object at this stage, strikes that object off from her linear 
order.  
Each agent who received an object up until this stage, reduces her quota by one, to 
obtain revised quotas. Any agent whose quota has been reduced to zero, withdraws 
from the procedure. If in the process all agents withdraw from the procedure, the 
procedure terminates. Otherwise the procedure moves to Stage 2, with participating 
agents being only those agents who either did not receive an item at Stage 1 or whose 
revised quota after stage 1 is positive. No agent whose quota is incomplete is 
removed from the linear order of any participating agent. 
Each agent who participate in the subsequent stage removes from her linear order all 
agents who have exhausted their quota. Each agent who received an object at Stage 1 
and proceeds to participate in the subsequent stage, removes from her linear order the 
(owner of) the item she received at Stage 1.  
Stage 2: Repeat Stage 1, among the participating agents. (This may involve an agent 
pointing to an agent she had at stage 1). Each agent who received an object up until 
this stage, reduces her quota by one, to obtain revised quotas. 
Repeating the process at most a finite number of times, we arrive at a stage where 
either all agents have filled their quota, or the agents who have not filled there quota, 
have by now struck all agents off their list. 
The procedure terminates now with the directed network A being defined such that 
for all i∈I, A(i) is the set of items currently in the possession of agent i. 
We claim that A belongs to the core of E. A is clearly feasible. 
Suppose there is a coalition M which blocks A. Thus there exists a permutation p: 
M→ M and a function y: M →  such that for all i∈M: (i)p(i) R(i) y(i); (ii) 
p(i)∈I\A(i).  
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Without loss of generality let an agent in M whose quota was exhausted first among 
all agents in M, be denoted 1. If agent 1’s quota was exhausted at the first stage of the 
procedure, she clearly got her best item and therefore could not be part of a blocking 
coalition. Hence no agent whose quota was exhausted at the first stage would be part 
of a blocking coalition. If agent 1’s quota was exhausted at stage 2, then the only 
agents that she could form a blocking coalition with, must have exhausted their quota 
in stage 1. Since agents who exhausted their quota in stage 1 cannot belong to M, it is 
not possible for agent 1 to belong to M either. Thus, no agent whose quota was 
exhausted at stage 2 can belong to M. Proceeding thus, we see that if agent 1’s quota 
was exhausted at stage k, then the owners of the items she could form a blocking 
coalition with must have exhausted their quota at a previous stage. Since agent 1 is 
assumed to be among the first to exhaust her quota among the agents in M, M cannot 
be a blocking coalition. This contradiction establishes the non-emptiness of the 
Core(E). Q.E.D.  
 
The purpose of requiring the termination rule in the above procedure to permit agents 
whose quota may have remained unexhausted may once again be illustrated by the 
following example. 
 
Example 3: Let I = {1,2} and suppose q(1) = 1 where as q(2) = 2. Let E be a directed 
network problem where agent 1 prefers 1 to 2. If A belongs to Core(E), then A(1) = 
{1}. Thus, whatever be the preference of agent 2, A(2) = {2}. In fact this would be 
the unique feasible network in Core(E). Clearly, the quota of agent 2 remains 
unexhausted at A.  
However, thee feasible network where agent 1 gets 2 and agent 2 gets both 1 and 2, 
exhausts the quota of all agents. This network is blocked by agent 1 and hence does 
not belong to the core. 
 
Note: Suppose the directed network A obtained in the proof of theorem 1 above, was 
the outcome of a procedure that terminated at stage K ≥ 1. For all agents i∈I, who 
received item j at stage K, let pK =  pi(j) = 1. 
If K > 1, then having defined pk for stages K, K-1,…, L < 1, define pL-1 = + 1. 
For all i ∈I, who receive an item j at stage k∈{L-1,…,K}, let p
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i(j) = pk. 
For i∈I and j∈A(i), pi(j) may be interpreted as a personalized price of item j to agent 
i. 
For all j∈I, let p(j) = min {pi(j) / j∈A(i), i∈I}. For i∈I and j∈I\A(i), let A-j(i) = 
{h∈A(i)/ jR(i)h}. 
The pair (A, <pi(j)/ j∈A(i), i∈I> satisfies the following property: (i) for all i∈I and 
j∈I\A(i) with A-j(i) ≠φ: p(j) > ∑
−∈ )(
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iAh
i
j
hp ; (ii) for all i ∈I, j ∈A(i) and h ∈I\A(i), [ 
hR(i) j] implies [ p(h) > pi(j)]; (iii) for all i∈I: ∑
∈ )}(/{
)(
iAjj
i jp = ∑
∈ )}(/{
)(
jAij
j ip . 
(i) says that for any agent i and any item j not belonging to A(i), the total payment 
that agent i makes for items she does not prefer to item j, is less than the least 
personalized price paid for item j. Now, (ii) follows from (i) since all personalized 
prices computed above, are strictly positive. (iii) says that, given any agent i, the sum 
of payments made by i is equal to the sum of payments received by i . 
 
 
A Combinatorial Allocation Problem and Its Non-empty Core 
 
In a combinatorial allocation problem (CAP) there is a non-empty finite set G of 
discrete items and a non-empty finite set I of agents. Each agent i∈I, is initially 
endowed with a non-empty set of items S(i), such that: (a) = G; (b) for all 
i,j∈I, with i≠j: S(i)∩S(j) = φ.  
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A preference relation for agent i∈I is summarized by a linear order R(i) over G. 
An allocation is a function A: I → 2G. 
For all i∈I, A(i) is the bundle received by agent i.  
An allocation A is said to be exclusive if for all i,j∈I with i ≠ j: A(i) ∩ A(j) = φ. 
Let q: I→ N(: the set of natural numbers) be such that for all i∈I, q(i) = |S(i)|, i.e. the 
cardinality of S(i). 
Let Λ(q) = {A/ A is an exclusive allocation satisfying |A(i)| = q(i) for all i∈I}. 
An allocation A is said to be feasible if A∈Λ(q).   
For i∈I and (S, a) ∈2G×G, we write S ≥i a if and only if either a∈S or bR(i)a for all 
b∈S. 
Clearly ≥i is a unilateral hyper-relation for all i∈I. 
A feasible allocation A is said to be blocked by a coalition (: a non-empty subset of 
agents) M, if there exists a permutation p: M→ M and a function x: M→U such 
that for no i∈M is it the case that A(i) ≥
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A feasible allocation A is said to belong to the core of the CAP, if it is not blocked by 
any coalition. 
The core of the above CAP, denoted C* is the set of feasible networks belonging to 
its core. 
 
Given a list of distinct agents i1,…,ik and a set of items x(i1),…, x(ik) with x(i)∈S(i) 
for all i∈{i1,…,ik} we say that a transaction is completed along the cycle (i1,…,ik) if 
each ij∈{i2,…,ik} receives x(ij-1) and i1 receives x(ik).  Thus, if k = 1, then after 
completion of transaction along the cycle, agent i1 receives x(i1). 
 
The proof of the following theorem, which is again a generalization of the one in 
Shapley and Scarf[1974], is almost identical to the proof of our Theorem 1. 
   
Theorem 2: Given a CAP as defined above, C* is non-empty. 
  
Proof: The only respects in which the proof here differs from the proof of Theorem 1, 
is that every time a transaction is completed along a cycle, all the items involved in 
the transaction are struck off from the list of all agents who participate in the 
subsequent stage of the procedure and the procedure stops when the quotas of all 
agents have been exhausted. Let an allocation A be the outcome of the procedure thus 
defined. 
We claim that A belongs to the C*. A is clearly feasible. 
Suppose there is a coalition M which blocks A. Thus there exists a permutation p: 
M→ M and functions x: M→U ,  y: M →  such that for all i∈M: 
(i)x(p(i)) R(i) y(i); (ii) x(p(i))∈G\A(i).  
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Without loss of generality let an agent in M whose quota was exhausted first among 
all agents in M, be denoted 1. If agent 1’s quota was exhausted at the first stage of the 
procedure, she clearly got her best item and therefore could not be part of a blocking 
coalition. Hence no agent whose quota was exhausted at the first stage would be part 
of a blocking coalition. If agent 1’s quota was exhausted at stage 2, then the only 
agents that she could form a blocking coalition with, must have exhausted their quota 
in stage 1. Since agents who exhausted their quota in stage 1 cannot belong to M, it is 
not possible for agent 1 to belong to M either. Thus, no agent whose quota was 
exhausted at stage 2 can belong to M. Proceeding thus, we see that if agent 1’s quota 
was exhausted at stage k, then the owners of the items she could form a blocking 
coalition with must have exhausted their quota at a previous stage. Since agent 1 is 
assumed to be among the first to exhaust her quota among the agents in M, M cannot 
be a blocking coalition. This contradiction establishes the non-emptiness of C*. 
Q.E.D.  
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